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In this paper we use theoretical frameworks from mathematics education and 
cognitive psychology to analyse Cauchy’s ideas of function, continuity, limit and 
infinitesimal expressed in his Cours D’Analyse. Our analysis focuses on the 
development of mathematical thinking from human perception and action into more 
sophisticated forms of reasoning and proof, offering different insights from those 
afforded by historical or mathematical analyses. It highlights the conceptual power 
of Cauchy’s vision and the fundamental change involved in passing from the dynamic 
variability of the calculus to the modern set-theoretic formulation of mathematical 
analysis. This offers a re-evaluation of the relationship between the natural geometry 
and algebra of elementary calculus that continues to be used in applied mathematics, 
and the formal set theory of mathematical analysis that develops in pure mathematics 
and evolves into the logical development of non-standard analysis using infinitesimal 
concepts. It suggests that educational theories developed to evaluate student learning 
are themselves based on the conceptions of the experts who formulate them. It 
encourages us to reflect on the principles that we use to analyse the developing 
mathematical thinking of students, and to make an effort to understand the rationale 
of differing theoretical viewpoints. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The calculus today is viewed in two fundamentally different ways: the theoretical 
calculus used in applications, often based on the symbolism of Leibniz, enhanced by 
the work of Cauchy using infinitesimal techniques, and the formal mathematical 
analysis of Weierstrass based on quantified set theory. In this paper we begin in 
section 2 by reviewing current scholarship in the history of mathematics. In section 3 
we complement the historical approach with an analysis of the evolution of 
mathematical ideas based on human cognitive development. This begins with the 
theory of Merlin Donald (2001) who distinguishes three levels of thinking, from 
immediate perception, to dynamic change over short periods of time and on to 
extended awareness appropriate for the building of more sophisticated theories.  It 
continues with a review of other theories, including Tall’s (2013) framework of three 
distinct ways of thinking mathematically through embodiment, symbolism and 
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formalism that is consistent with Donald’s theory and together they provide a 
fundamental framework to consider the evolution of ideas from ancient Greece, 
through the development of the calculus, on to the formal development of 
mathematical analysis and beyond. 
Section 4 offers a detailed analysis of Cauchy’s conceptions, arising from the work of 
his predecessors to build his own view of quantities that could be constant or variable 
and marked on a number line, allowing him to develop his own conceptions of 
functions, continuity and limits, using the idea of an infinitesimal generated by a 
variable sequence whose terms tended to zero. 
Section 5 follows the transition to the mathematical analysis of Weierstrass, the 
formalist approach of Hilbert and the rejection of the infinitesimal approach by 
Cantor as new approaches evolve in the twentieth century. However, we show that 
the formalist approach of Hilbert can be used to prove a simple structure theorem that 
any ordered field containing the real numbers as a subfield must contain 
infinitesimals and that any element that lies between two real numbers must be of the 
form ‘a real number plus an infinitesimal’. This simple theorem should not be 
confused with the more complex issues of the logical approach to non-standard 
analysis. 
In section 6, we note that the idea of arbitrarily small quantities that evolved in 
history continue to arise in our students and to be used in applications of 
mathematics. 
This leads to the final section in which we consider the implications of these results 
to mathematics education, which suggest that different communities of practice, in 
school, in various applications, and in university pure mathematics can each hold a 
particular view of calculus that may be appropriate in their own community but may 
not be appropriate in others. 
2. SCHOLARSHIP IN THE HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 
An examination of contemporary Cauchy scholarship reveals a surprising lack of 
consensus among scholars concerning his contribution to the development of modern 
views of calculus and analysis. The traditional view elaborated by Grabiner (1983, p. 
185), is that 
Delta-epsilon proofs are first found in the works of Augustin-Louis Cauchy. 
Schubring (2005, p. 480), on the other hand, based on a study of Cauchy’s published 
works and letters, concludes that 
he was actually confined by his adherence to the Leibnizian-Newtonian tradition of the 
eighteenth century. 
A recent study by Ehrlich (2006) documents an uninterrupted tradition of work on 
infinitesimal-enriched systems, from the end of the 19th century onward. Meanwhile, 
traditional accounts tend to credit Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass with the 
‘elimination’ of infinitesimals from mathematics. Cantor, on the one hand, introduced 
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infinite cardinals that did not have multiplicative inverses, and on the other, 
completed the number line using Cauchy sequences of rationals (Cantor, 1872) to 
postulate a one-to-one correspondence between real numbers and the linear 
continuum of geometry. Cantor is believed by many professional mathematicians to 
have shown that there is only one consistent conception of the geometric continuum, 
with irrationals ‘filling’ the gaps between the rationals to ‘complete’ the real number 
line and leave no room for ephemeral entities that are ‘infinitesimal’. The real 
numbers of Cantor and Dedekind were accepted as the foundation of modern analysis 
developed by Weierstrass. 
However, Felix Klein reflected on this development and observed that 
The scientific mathematics of today is built upon the series of developments which we 
have been outlining. But an essentially different conception of infinitesimal calculus has 
been running parallel with this through the centuries. (Klein, 1908, p. 214.) 
He noted that this parallel conception of calculus ‘harks back to old metaphysical 
speculations concerning the structure of the continuum according to which this was 
made up of ultimate indivisible infinitely small parts.’ (ibid. p. 214.) 
When Robinson (1966) provided a logical approach to the calculus using 
infinitesimals, the role of Cauchy’s ideas was again brought to the fore. Was Cauchy 
a forerunner of the epsilon-delta approach of Weierstrass, or of the infinitesimal 
approach of Robinson? Or was he something else? 
In considering various modern views by historians and mathematicians, Grattan-
Guinness expanded on an observation by Freudenthal (1971, p. 377), to the effect that 
succeeding generations interpret earlier mathematics in different ways, in the 
following terms: 
 It is mere feedback-style ahistory to read Cauchy (and contemporaries such as Bernard 
Bolzano) as if they had read Weierstrass already. On the contrary, their own pre-
Weierstrassian muddles need historical reconstruction. (Grattan-Guinness, 2004, p. 176.) 
Bair et al. (2013) analyse the assumptions underlying post-Weierstrassian approaches 
to the history of mathematics and argue for a more sympathetic account of the history 
of infinitesimal mathematics.  
Modern views of Cauchy’s work are inevitably seen through the eyes of various 
commentators each of whom has a cultural background that adopts a particular view 
of mathematics. For instance, in looking at a geometrical line, do we see a continuum 
with length and no breadth as originally conceived in Euclid Book I—where points 
lie on lines, either as endpoints or where two lines meet—or do we see the line as a 
set-theoretic aggregate of the points that make it up? According to Cantor (1872), the 
real line is precisely the complete ordered field that is the basis of modern epsilon-
delta analysis and does not contain any infinitesimals. Yet, according to the non-
standard analysis of Robinson (1966), the real line ℝ is part of an enhanced 
continuum *ℝ which includes not only infinitesimals, but also infinite elements that 
are their inverses. 
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How then do we interpret the past taking explicit account of the colouring of our 
interpretations with the encrustations of later generations? This proves to be a 
complex and subtle enterprise where contributions may be made by historians, 
philosophers, mathematicians, cognitive scientists and others, each offering subtly 
different views with a variety of possibly conflicting interpretations. 
3. THEORIES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Our approach here is to consider the underlying nature of human perception and how 
our unique human facility for language and symbolism leads to more sophisticated 
forms of mathematical reasoning, both in the individual and in shared communities of 
practice over the generations.  
For example, although we may speak about a point in space having a position but 
no size, none of us can actually see such a point because it is too small and we 
represent it as a physical mark with a finite size. Not only can we not perceive 
arbitrarily small quantities in space, we cannot perceive arbitrarily small intervals in 
time because the brain takes around a fortieth of a second to build up a selective 
binding of neural structures to interpret our perceptions (the precise time depending 
on the extent of the neural connections involved). This leads to a conflict between our 
perception, in which a halving process soon produces a perceptual quantity that is too 
small to see, and a symbolic process of halving that involves a symbolic quantity that 
never precisely equals zero.  We will consider the underlying mechanisms that shape 
human thought, building from the foundational level of human perception through 
successive levels of consciousness identified by the psychologist Merlin Donald. 
3.1 Donald’s three levels of consciousness 
In his book A Mind So Rare, Donald (2001) suggests that human consciousness 
works on three levels. The first is the immediate consciousness of our perception, 
which takes about a fortieth of a second to combine neural activity into a thinkable 
concept. Indeed, we have known since the development of the moving pictures in the 
early twentieth century, that showing a sequence of still images separated by a short 
interval of darkness offers a sense of relatively smooth motion at speeds faster than 
around fourteen frames per second (the minimum speed in early digital cameras 
offering moderately smooth video recording). 
Our perception of motion occurs by coordinating our changing perception through 
a second level of consciousness that Donald calls ‘short-term awareness’, lasting 
continuously over a period of two or three seconds. It is this level of consciousness 
that allows us to perceive a shape moving in space, so as to recognise that it is the 
same entity seen from different viewpoints. 
His third level of consciousness, which he terms ‘extended awareness’, occurs over 
longer periods as we reflect on our previous experiences, bringing disparate ideas 
together, possibly through recording them using words, symbols, or pictures that we 
can consider simultaneously to build more subtle relationships. 
The perceptual notion of continuity is a second level operation. Perceptual 
continuity occurs both as a phenomenon in time, as we dynamically draw a curve 
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with a stroke of a pencil, without taking the pencil off the paper, and also in space as 
we observe a continuous curve without any gaps, or a continuous surface or solid. 
In a similar vein, Klein notes that 
It is precisely in the discovery and in the development of the infinitesimal calculus that 
this inductive process, built up without compelling logical steps, played such a great role; 
and the effective heuristic aid was very often sense perception. And I mean here 
immediate sense perception, with all its inexactness, for which a curve is a stroke of 
definite width, rather than an abstract perception which postulates a complete passage to 
the limit, yielding a one dimensional line. (Klein, 1908, p. 208.) 
As mathematicians, we build on the perceptual continuity experienced through our 
short-term awareness, to shift to a third level of extended awareness where formal 
continuity is defined verbally and symbolically. Such a shift changes the focus on 
continuity, from a global phenomenon drawing a graph dynamically with a stroke of 
a pencil, to a formal definition in terms of a Weierstrassian challenge ‘tell me how 
close you want 
 
f (x)  to be to 
 
f (a) , and I will tell you how small you need to make 
the difference between x and a so that 
 
f (x)
 
and 
 
f (a) are as close as desired.’ Such 
a computable, yet cumbersome, description of continuity has the effect of shifting the 
mathematics from a perceptual idea related to our senses, to a computational process 
that is potentially achievable. In the late 19th century, this approach became the 
foundation of modern mathematical analysis. 
3.2 Theories of the cognitive development of mathematical thinking 
There are various theoretical perspectives that are relevant in considering the 
development from human perception of change to its symbolisation in calculus and 
formalisation in mathematical analysis. 
Recent theories of the development of mathematical thinking (Dubinsky, 1991; 
Sfard, 1991; Gray & Tall 1994) focus on the way that humans carry out mathematical 
operations, such as addition, sharing, calculating the limit of a sequence, 
differentiation and integration. At each stage, we perform a process that occurs in 
time, to produce an output that may also be conceived as a mental entity, independent 
of time. Counting gives rise to the concept of number, the process of addition 3+2 
gives rise to a mental concept, the sum, which is also written using the same symbol 
3+2; sharing gives the concept of fraction; calculating a trigonometric ratio such as
 
sin A  = opposite/hypotenuse gives the concept of sine; the process of differentiation 
gives the derivative; the process of integration gives the integral. In every case, a 
symbolic notation, such as 3+2, ¾, 
 
a(b + c) , dy/dx, ( )f x dx∫ , 211/n n∞=∑ , represents 
both a desired process and the resulting concept. Gray & Tall (1994) refer to this 
conception of a symbol, that dually represents process or concept, as a procept, with 
the additional flexiblity that different symbols with the same output, such as 
 
a(b + c)  
and 
 
ab + ac , represent the same procept. 
Analyzing a sequence 
 
(a
n
)  given by a specific formula involves computing a 
succession of terms and observing how the process tends to a specific value—the 
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limit. Cornu (1983, 1991) described how students think of the process of getting 
small as producing an object that is itself arbitrarily small, but not zero. Tall (1986) 
defined this to be a generic limit. It occurs when the focus of attention shifts from a 
sequence of distinct real constants a1, a2, a3, …, an, … to considering the term an as a 
variable quantity that varies with n, and, as n increases, the variable quantity 
becomes smaller but may never become zero. This produces a mental compression of 
thought in which distinct terms are conceived and spoken of as a single varying 
entity. 
Such a compression of thought is a widespread phenomenon (Cornu, 1991). For 
instance, the infinite decimal 0.999… is widely considered to be a quantity ‘just less 
than 1’, or even ‘as close as it is possible to reach 1 without actually equalling it.’ 
This phenomenon has been analysed at a number of levels over the years from the 
conflict caused by a potentially infinite process that goes on forever to more recent 
analyses involving the meaning of infinitesimal concepts (eg. Katz & Katz, 2010a, 
2010b and Ely, 2010).  
Tall (1986) linked the phenomenon to the historic ‘principle of continuity’ (or ‘law 
of continuity’) formulated by Leibniz in an unpublished text referred to as Cum 
Prodiisset, circ. 1701 in the following terms: 
In any supposed [continuous]1 transition, ending in any terminus, it is permissible to 
institute a general reasoning, in which the final terminus may also be included. (Child, 
1920, p. 147.) 
A related formulation is found in a 1702 letter to Varignon, where Leibniz wrote: 
The rules of the finite succeed in the infinite […] and vice versa, the rules of the infinite 
succeed in the finite. 
(see Katz and Sherry (2012 and 2013) and Sherry and Katz (2013) for a fuller 
discussion). Based on this general heuristic, Leibniz was able to assume that 
infinitesimals enjoy the same properties as ordinary numbers, and to operate on them 
accordingly. 
Lakoff and Núñez reformulated a related principle in their ‘basic metaphor of 
infinity’ in which 
We hypothesize that all cases of infinity—infinite sets, points at infinity, limits of infinite 
series, infinite intersections, least upper bounds—are special cases of a single conceptual 
metaphor in which processes that go on indefinitely are conceptualized as having an end 
and an ultimate result. (Lakoff and Núñez, 2000, p. 258.) 
The underlying brain activity is more fundamental. Useful links between neurons are 
strengthened and provide new and more immediate paths of thought in which an on-
going process may be imagined as a thinkable concept. Throughout the history of the 
calculus, mathematicians ranging from Leibniz to Euler to Cauchy sought to motivate 
infinitesimals in terms of sequences tending to zero. Thus, a potentially infinite 
                                               
1
 Child omitted the word ‘continuous’, which is in the original Latin. 
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temporal sequence of distinct terms (an) tending to zero is verbalised as a single term 
an that varies as n increases, producing a mental entity that is arbitrarily small yet not 
zero. 
This is a conception that has caused controversy for millennia. If one continually 
halves a quantity, does the process continue forever becoming smaller and smaller 
without ever reaching zero, or does one reach an indivisible element that can no 
longer be further subdivided? The perceptual brain, with its finite capacity to 
perceive and sense, cannot resolve this problem but the brain’s extended level of 
awareness (Donald’s level 3) is able to formulate the problem conceptually and 
linguistically to express opinions and beliefs about a possible resolution. 
3.3 Tall’s three worlds of mathematics 
The link from the perceptual world of our human experience to the computational 
world of arithmetic and algebra was initiated by Vieta, Descartes, and others. This led 
to the calculus of Newton and Leibniz that computed naturally perceived phenomena 
such as the measurement of length, area, volume, time, distance, velocity, 
acceleration and their rate of change and growth using the computational and 
manipulable symbolism of the calculus. Cantor, Dedekind and Weierstrass took 
matters a step further by interpreting the number line in terms of the symbolism of 
number, arithmetic, order and completeness. 
However, it was the introduction of formal axiomatic mathematics by Hilbert 
(1900) that radically changed the way in which we are able to think of mathematical 
ideas. He switched attention from the natural phenomena that we perceive physically 
and conceive mentally, to the properties of the phenomena. A mathematical structure 
is specified by axioms, and deductions are made by mathematical proof. This releases 
mathematical thinking from the limitations of human perception to the possibilities of 
formally-defined systems and their consequent properties. 
Tall (2004, 2008) formulated three essentially different ways in which 
mathematical thinking develops, which relate both to the historical development of 
ideas and also to the cognitive development of the individual from child to 
mathematician: 
(1) Conceptual embodiment builds on human perceptions and actions, developing mental 
images that are verbalized in increasingly sophisticated ways and become perfect mental 
entities in our imagination. 
(2) Proceptual2 symbolism grows out of physical actions into mathematical procedures 
that are symbolized and conceived dually as operations to perform and symbols that can 
themselves be operated on by calculation and manipulation. 
                                               
2
 The name of the mental world of proceptual symbolism was later modified to operational 
symbolism (e.g. in Tall, 2010, 2013) to include the wide range of flexible proceptual and routine 
procedural operations used by different learners. Here it is entirely proper to focus on the more 
subtle flexible relationship between process and concept. 
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(3) Axiomatic formalism builds formal knowledge in axiomatic systems in a suitable 
foundational framework (such as formal set theory or formal logic) whose properties are 
deduced by mathematical proof. 
In what follows we will use the shortened terms, ‘embodied’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘formal’ 
on the understanding that these words reflect the meanings given here rather than the 
various other meanings found in the literature. In broad terms, these ways of 
mathematical thinking develop one from another in the cognitive growth of the child 
into the adult. 
Mathematical ideas begin in the perception and action of the embodied world. 
Perceptions can develop through description, definition and deduction in Euclidean 
geometry (as noted in successive levels by van Hiele, 1986), within an increasingly 
sophisticated world of conceptual embodiment, refined through subtle thought 
experiment and the use of language to develop platonic conceptions of abstract 
thought. 
Actions can lead to mathematical operations that are symbolised and give new 
forms of calculation and manipulation at increasingly sophisticated levels. 
Conceptual embodiment and proceptual symbolism develop in parallel, blending 
together various aspects to give even more sophisticated forms of mathematical 
thinking. 
Distinct types of mathematical reasoning arise in embodiment and symbolism. 
Euclidean proof in geometry is expressed verbally in terms of definitions and 
theorems and yet is fundamentally based on human embodiment such as placing one 
triangle on top of another to see if they fit, as in the principle of congruence. Proof in 
arithmetic begins with the observation of regularities such as the properties of 
multiplication of whole numbers leading to the concepts of prime and composite 
numbers and the proof that any whole number has a unique expression as a product 
of primes. Algebraic proof builds on the observed regularities of arithmetical 
operations to base proofs on the ‘rules of arithmetic’.  
At a later stage, linguistic and logical sophistication lead to a form of mathematics 
that is presented in terms of set-theoretic axiomatic definitions and formal proof. 
In this framework, the perceptual conception of continuity is now seen in terms of 
embodiment. It relates to the dynamic movement of a pencil as one draws the graph 
to get a curve that is perceptually continuous without any gaps. Such an interpretation 
is often seen as an ‘intuitive’ form of continuity that lacks formal precision. 
However, such perceptual beginnings are an essential starting point for the later 
development of more sophisticated forms of mathematical thinking that develop both 
in the individual and also in succeeding generations over the centuries. 
Cauchy flourished at a time in history when the calculus had developed into a 
remarkable facility in computing the symbolic solutions to many problems involving 
change and growth, yet was still subject to controversy over various aspects of the 
theory, in particular, the use of infinitesimal quantities that could be imagined in the 
mind yet not perceived by the physical human eye. 
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In the introduction to his Cours D’Analyse of 1821, he declared that he could not 
speak about the continuity of functions without using the properties of infinitely 
small quantities: 
En parlant de la continuité des fonctions, je n’ai pu me dispenser de faire connaître les 
propriétés principales des quantités infiniment petites, propriétés qui servent de base au 
calcul infinitésimal. (Cauchy, 1821, Introduction p. ii.)3 
The question is: what are Cauchy’s ‘quantités infiniment petites’? Where do they fit 
in the development from perceptual embodiment to symbolic process and concept, 
and on to appropriate forms of mathematical definition and proof? As we reflect on 
this, we must attempt to consider Cauchy’s ideas in his own terms and not simply 
analyse them in a manner that reflects our current views of mathematics that were not 
available in his time. 
4. CAUCHY 
Cauchy’s ideas arose at a particular time in history as French mathematics benefited 
from the developments of previous generations, in particular, the insight of Descartes, 
who united the geometry of the Greeks with the vision of points on the line and in the 
plane corresponding to numbers. His development should be seen in terms of his 
context at the time. 
4.1 The legacy of Cauchy’s predecessors 
Geometric ideas relate back to the theory of Euclid using definitions and explicit 
assumptions (called ‘postulates’ and ‘common notions’) to build a proven system of 
propositions deduced from first principles. Implicitly, Euclidean proof depends on 
being able to interpret the meanings of the definitions. For instance, the first four 
definitions of Euclid Book I specify a point as ‘that which has no part’, a line is 
‘breadthless length’, ‘the ends of a line are points’, and ‘a straight line is a line which 
lies evenly with the points on itself.’ 
Despite the apparent dependence on the implicit meanings of the terms concerned, 
these definitions carry a number of implications. For instance, a ‘line’—which may 
be curved—has a (finite) length with a point at each end. A point can lie on a line, (as 
an endpoint, or a point where lines cross), but a line is an entity in itself and does not 
‘consist of points’ in a modern set-theoretic sense. From a modern viewpoint where a 
line is seen as consisting of a set of points, this simple idea leads to controversy. For 
instance, Ferraro (2004, p. 37) argued that a Euclidean geometric line has endpoints 
and so one cannot think of it separately as an open interval without endpoints. On the 
other hand, Cauchy scholars (such as Grabiner, 1983, Laugwitz, 1987, p. 261) see 
Cauchy variables as ranging through values represented as variable points on a line 
without including the endpoints, and argue that both open and closed intervals are 
found in Cauchy. A level 2 perception of drawing a finite line segment in Euclidean 
                                               
3
 The page numbers in Cours D’Analyse refer to the collected edition of Cauchy’s works that can be 
downloaded for personal use from http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k90195m/f12 
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geometry sees a line as an entity in itself drawn from one point to another, and points 
lie on it, either at the ends or where one line crosses another. 
For the Greeks, geometry and arithmetic were considered as being fundamentally 
distinct. Arithmetic operations could be applied to whole numbers and fractions, but 
the product of two lengths is an area, so the Greeks did not build a full arithmetic in 
geometry. Instead, they compared magnitudes of the same kind (length with length or 
area with area) as in the following translation presented by Joyce (1997): 
 Triangles and parallelograms which have the same height are to one another as their 
bases. (Euclid Book VI, proposition 1.) 
The Greek theory of proportions focused on comparing magnitudes by various 
methods, for example, using parallel lines in theorems such as: 
If a straight line is drawn parallel to one of the sides of a triangle, then it cuts the sides of 
the triangle proportionally. (Euclid Book VI, Proposition 2.) 
In figure 1 the line DE is constructed to be parallel to the base BC, and the equality of 
proportions is written as AB:AD :: AC:AE and spoken as ‘AB is to AD as AC is to 
AE’. 
 
Figure 1: parallel lines and proportion  
In the seventeenth century, Descartes (1635) set himself free of the limitations 
imposed by this view by the simple expedient of choosing a length to be the unit in a 
particular calculation. He was then able to multiply and divide lengths. 
By rewriting AB:AD :: AC:AE as 
 
 
AB
AD
=
AC
AE
 
he could calculate AB = AC × AD by choosing AE = 1 and performing a suitable 
geometric construction. Not only did this give a full arithmetic of numbers as lengths, 
it allowed him to link the position of a point on a line to a signed number using a 
chosen origin and unit length. This extended to the identification of points in the 
plane as ordered pairs of numbers relative to a given pair of axes. Curves in the plane 
could now be described by algebraic relationships, allowing a complementary 
interchange of ideas between geometry and algebra. 
Leibniz (1684) used the ideas of Descartes to compute the slopes of curves and 
areas that had curves as boundaries, by imagining a curve as a polygon with an 
 11 
infinite number of infinitesimally small sides, so that he could compute the slope of 
the curve as the quotient dy/dx for infinitesimal increments dx and dy in the 
independent variable x and the dependent variable y. 
Subsequently Euler (1748) continued the development of calculus in the eighteenth 
century, focussing on algebra rather than geometry, declaring the principle of ‘the 
generality of algebra’ that calculations with complex numbers and infinite series are 
subject to the same principles as the natural properties of operations with ordinary 
numbers. Such a principle led him to operate with infinitesimals in a purely symbolic 
manner, where infinitesimal quantities were conceived to be zero, in the sense that 
they did not change the value of a finite number when added, and yet operated in 
such a way that their ratios dy/dx could be calculated. His concept of the generality of 
algebra took him much further, declaring that 
Calculus concerns variable quantities, that is, quantities considered in general. If it were 
not generally true that d(log x)/dx = 1/x, whatever value we give to x, either positive, 
negative, or even imaginary, we would never be able to make use of this rule, the truth of 
the differential calculus being founded on the generality of the rules it contains. (Euler, 
1749.) 
However, such operations with infinitesimals did not meet with universal approval. 
For instance, d’Alembert observed that, contrary to generally held opinion, 
In the differential calculus one is not at all concerned with infinitely small quantities but 
only with the limits of definite quantities. The words infinite and small are used only to 
abbreviate expressions. (Breuss, 1968.) 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Cauchy adopted a view rooted in variable 
quantities (already found in l’Hôpital, 1696), by defining an infinitesimal in terms of 
a sequence of familiar numbers whose values diminished to zero. 
4.2 Cauchy’s distinction between number and quantity 
Cauchy lived in a culture that used the Cartesian correspondence between points on a 
line and (signed) numbers, which extended to provide a correspondence between 
points in the plane and pairs of (signed) numbers. In this correspondence, points lay 
geometrically on the line or in the plane, the line and the plane were not solely an 
aggregate of the set of points. Cauchy used these correspondences in calculus and 
also in the more subtle development of complex differentiation and integration. His 
concept of magnitude related to fundamental Euclidean meanings where angles, 
lengths, areas and volumes are magnitudes that are numbers without a sign, but 
signed numbers could be used as quantities in calculations and to mark the positions 
of points on a line or in the plane. 
In the opening pages of his preliminary chapter of Cours D’Analyse (1821), 
written for his students at the École Polytechnique, he steadily unfolds his distinction 
between numbers which are unsigned and used to count and measure, and quantities, 
which occur in operations with numbers. ‘Quantities’ may be positive or negative, 
written as numbers preceded by a sign (+ or –) and marked on the number line—with 
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positive numbers to the right of the origin and negative to the left—operating with 
prescribed rules, such as ‘the product of two negative quantities is positive.’ 
He then goes on to speak of constant quantities and variable quantities, where 
constants have fixed values and are represented by letters at the beginning of the 
alphabet, and variable quantities can take on various values and are represented by 
letters at the end of the alphabet. These are long-established conventions that go back 
to Euler. However, what is distinctive in his work is the way that he uses 
‘infinitesimal quantities’ as computational variables. 
Cauchy noted that certain variable quantities take on successive values that 
approach a fixed value (lorsque les valeurs successivement attribuées à une même 
variable s’approchent indéfiniment d’une valeur fixe), so that they differ from that 
value by as little as one wishes (de manière à finir par en différer aussi peu que l’on 
voudra). The fixed value is then called the limit of all the others (cette dernière est 
appelée la limite des toute les autres). 
Later, in the opening of chapter II, he confirms that his notion of ‘approaching 
indefinitely’ (approchent indéfiniment) does not necessarily imply a monotonic 
sequence where terms are successively smaller, but could include a succession of 
numbers such as 
 
1
4 , 
 
1
3 , 
 
1
6 , 
 
1
5 , 
 
1
8 , 
 
1
7 , … 
which eventually become smaller than any given value. 
This concept of limit reads very much like our modern notion, which is supported 
by his example that an irrational number is a limit of a sequence of fractions. But 
then he gives a further example: 
En Géométrie, la surface du cercle est la limite vers laquelle convergent les surfaces des 
polygones inscrits, tandis que le nombre de leurs côtés croît de plus en plus. 
‘A circle is the limit of inscribed polygons as the number of sides increases more and 
more.’ Thus Cauchy’s notion of limit already has aspects that extend the idea of a 
limit of a sequence of numbers to more general mathematical situations. In particular, 
in this case the polygonal figure grows outwards to get as close as desired to the 
limiting circle. This particular example has the limiting circle as a barrier that ‘limits’ 
the growth of the polygon. In general, Cauchy allows a limit to be approached both 
from above and below (as in case of a series with terms having alternate signs) but he 
also distinguishes between the limit of a function, such as 1/x at the origin, which he 
sees as being positive infinite from the left and negative infinite from the right, an 
example to which we will return later. 
At the beginning of his Résumé des Leçons…, he introduces the concept of 
infinitesimal quantity (infiniment petit) in terms of a variable with a sequence of 
values whose absolute value (valeur numérique) tends to zero: 
Lorsque les valeurs numériques successives d’une même variable décroissent 
indéfiniment, de manière à s’abaisser au-dessous de tout nombre donné, cette variable 
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devient ce qu’on nomme un infiniment petit ou une quantité infiniment petite. Une 
variablé de cette espèce a zéro pour limite. (Cauchy, 1823, p. 4.) 
In this definition, he uses both the term ‘infiniment petit’ as a noun, and ‘une quantité 
infiniment petite’ where the phrase ‘infiniment petite’ is an adjective applying to the 
feminine noun ‘quantité’. Conveniently, the gender given by the ending of ‘petit’ or 
‘petite’ clearly differentiates the difference between noun and adjective or, in 
proceptual terms, between concept and process. The quantity is a variable and 
Cauchy says that ‘cette variable devient ce qu’on nomme un infiniment petit’ which 
translates to ‘this variable becomes what one calls infinitely small.’ In proceptual 
terms, therefore, Cauchy is speaking of a process that becomes small, rather than a 
concept that is small. 
He continues by introducing +∞ as the limit of a sequence that increases 
indefinitely and –∞ as the limit of a sequence that decreases negatively. In this way 
his quantities now include the infinitely small and the infinitely large, although he 
continues to insist that numbers are always finite. 
The numbers are extended to include positive and negative quantities in the form 
of signed numbers, but Cauchy also allows variable quantities (sequences of signed 
numbers) that may operate as infinitesimal or infinite quantities.  It is a central point 
of contention among Cauchy scholars whether his continuum included only real 
numbers or whether it is enhanced by the inclusion of infinitesimals. 
As a possible response to this dilemma, we note that if Cauchy sees points as lying 
on a line, in the manner of Greek geometry, then the line is not composed of points, 
but is rather an entity in itself on which points lie.  Such points may be constants, 
staying in a fixed place, or variable quantities moving around. The question of the 
nature of Cauchy's continuum arises in the change in meaning, from Cauchy’s view 
based on Greek geometry and the developments of Descartes, to Cantor’s view of the 
continuum as the aggregate of its points, a viewpoint that is shared in our modern 
formulation of mathematical analysis and may cause a misinterpretation of Cauchy’s 
original intentions. 
At the opening of chapter II, Cauchy recalls his definition of infiniment petit in the 
following terms: 
On dit qu’une quantité variable devient infiniment petite, lorsque sa valeur numérique 
décroît indéfiniment de manière à converger vers la limite zéro. 
His ‘quantité variable infiniment petite’ is a variable quantity given by a sequence of 
values whose absolute value (valeur numérique) converges to the limit zero; 
geometrically, this can be viewed as a sequence of points marked on a number line, 
successively closer to the origin. 
4.3 Cauchy’s conception of function 
In chapter 1 of Cours D’Analyse, Cauchy introduces his notion of function, speaking 
explicitly about a relationship between two variables, say x and y, where one is the 
independent variable x, and the other is the dependent variable y whose values 
depend on x. He already has the familiar range of standard functions, including 
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polynomials, rational functions, trigonometric functions, powers, exponentials and 
logarithms with a variety of behaviours that he needs to take into account. 
Throughout his text he speaks of functions in general terms, but his examples are 
always given as combinations of standard functions, which is to be expected in a 
textbook intended for student engineers. 
He allows both explicit functions (where y is a function of x) and implicit functions 
(where x and y have a relationship between them). This enables him to consider a 
relationship such as 
 
y = x2  where y is an explicit function of x, but when x is 
expressed in terms of y, there are two roots 
 
y = ± x
 for positive x. He has his own 
special notion for such cases, using a single root 
 
y = x
 to denote the positive root 
      
 
y = + x
 and a double root sign for both roots, 
 
y = x . In the same manner, for the 
inverse sine function he uses 
 
y = arcsin(x)  for the principal value in which 
 
−pi / 2 ≤ y ≤ pi / 2  and a special double parenthesis notation 
 
y = arcsin((x)) to denote 
the multiple values. These conceptions should alert the modern reader to be aware 
that Cauchy uses terminology in a manner appropriate for his own era and this may 
differ significantly from modern usage. 
4.4 Cauchy’s conception of limit 
Cauchy’s conception of limit also allows it to have multiple values (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Multiple values of limits 
Here we see that the function 1/x has two possible limits as x tends to 0, which are 
+∞, –∞, and 
 
sin(1/ x)  has an infinite number of limiting values between –1 and +1. 
Cauchy’s notation makes interesting reading for someone steeped in the concepts of 
modern analysis where a limit, if it exists, must be unique. 
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There is a subtle ambiguity in meaning of the opening sentence where he speaks of 
‘une variable positive ou négative représentée par x converge vers la limite 0’. Does 
this mean that a single variable x can move between being positive or negative 
(moving in from either side) or does it refer to two different cases: one negative 
moving in from the left and the other positive moving in from the right? In general he 
allows sequences to have terms with different signs, just as Leibniz did when proving 
the theorem that if 
 
(a
n
)  is a monotone sequence of positive terms tending to zero 
then the alternating series ( 1)n
n
a−∑  tends to a limit. 
In dealing with the limit of 
 
1/ x  where x tends to zero, Cauchy separates out the 
two distinct cases where 
 
lim((1/ x))  has two values, +∞ from the left and –∞ from 
the right. This has possible subtle links to the meaning of the French term ‘limite’ 
which is used in a different way from the English term ‘limit’. While both are used to 
mean the mathematical limit, the French term limite is also used to denote the end-
points of an interval. This brings in subtle shades of meaning in Cauchy’s writing. 
In the case of the two ‘limites’ for the variable 
 
1/ x , we see that each one 
essentially adds a single endpoint to the curved lines making up the graph on either 
side of the origin. In exactly the same way, adding the limit points 
 
x = −∞  to the 
negative part of the graph and 
 
x = +∞  to the positive part of the graph complete the 
curved lines of the two parts of the graph by adding their ‘limites’. Now both curved 
parts of the geometric graphs fit the Greek notion of a line with endpoints at each 
end.  
The final case he mentions concerns the limit of sin(1/x) having ‘an infinity of 
values between the limits 1 and +1’. This proves to be even more interesting and we 
will return to it at the end of the next section when we have discussed the notion of 
continuity. 
4.5 Cauchy’s conception of continuity 
Cauchy presents his definition of continuity in three consecutive stages, one 
following immediately after another. (Figure 3.) 
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Figure 3: Cauchy’s definition(s) of continuity 
His first definition speaks of a function 
 
f (x)  which, for each value of x between two 
given limits, has a unique finite value. The term ‘limite’ here means the endpoints of 
an interval. A function is said to be continuous if, for a value x between these limits, 
an infinitesimal increase α in x causes the difference 
 
f (x + α ) − f (x) , which depends 
on the new variable α, to decrease indefinitely with α. Note that this a process 
definition: the difference decreases indefinitely as α decreases. 
The second definition is given in italics, which suggests that this is his main 
definition that he may wish his students to commit to memory. It states that (for x 
between the given limits), an infinitesimal change in x gives an infinitesimal change 
in the function 
 
f (x) . Notice the subtle change in meaning as the process of change, 
formulated in the first definition ‘as the difference decreases indefinitely’, subtly 
becomes a concept of change using the noun phrase ‘infiniment petit’ in the second. 
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Of course, Cauchy himself is generally careful to explain that a null sequence 
becomes infinitely small, rather than saying that it is an infinitely small quantity. 
However, this façon de parler introduces not one, but two, new elements in the 
definition of continuity. 
First it gives an operable definition of computing the difference 
 
f (x + α ) − f (x)
for an infinitesimal α, because α is generated by a sequence 
 
a1 , 
 
a2  
 
a3, …, 
 
a
n
… of 
finite quantities (numbers with signs); see Section 6 above.  Thus, the sequence of 
values 
 
f (x + a1) , 
 
f (x + a2 ), 
 
f (x + a3), … is a computable sequence of values which 
can be checked to determine if it tends to zero. (We note that nowhere in the book 
does Cauchy perform a specific numerical calculation. However, such a computation 
would often become quite complicated and we interpret Cauchy’s presentation as 
taking the pragmatic route of giving specific examples where the general idea of 
convergence of the terms appears to be evident without the need to do what might be 
a tricky calculation.) 
Secondly, and more significantly, the language compresses the process of 
becoming arbitrarily small from the phrase ‘decroit indefiniment’ into the noun 
‘infiniment petit’, as in Cauchy's 1823 definition cited in Section 6.  Such a noun can 
now function as a mental entity as if it were a manipulable concept in its own right. 
Cauchy does not remark explicitly on this transition from process to mental entity, 
however, it is a natural development, as expressed succinctly by Laugwitz: 
Having recognized the usefulness of infinitely small magnitudes in research, he must 
have been tempted not only to use them in concurrently written textbooks but also to 
justify them rigorously. This was a stepwise process. At the beginning we still encounter 
the traditional locutions about variables with limit zero or infinity. In time, the infinitely 
small magnitudes, soon referred to as numbers, acquire independence and are handled 
like ‘genuine’ numbers. (Laugwitz 1997, p. 657.) 
Such a manner of speaking is common in the informal conversation of 
mathematicians, and also in the increasingly subtle thinking of growing children as 
they learn to switch flexibly from thinking of an operation as a process to be carried 
out and the value given by the process (Gray & Tall, 1994, Tall, 1991). 
The third definition moves on to expand the definition of continuity to include the 
notion of discontinuity. This says that a function is continuous in the neighbourhood 
of a particular value of the variable x, whenever it is continuous between two limits 
for x, even very close (our italics). Cauchy contrasts this with the notion of a function 
being discontinuous at a particular value of x if it ceases to be continuous in a 
neighbourhood of x. In particular, he notes that, in a neighbourhood of zero the 
function 1/x ‘becomes infinite’, and, as a consequence is discontinuous there. 
These definitions of continuity may be read in various ways depending on the 
experiences of the commentator. For example, they may be read as introducing the 
formal definition of pointwise continuity. Yet even though Cauchy speaks of 
continuity at a particular value of x, he interprets this in the neighbourhood of that 
value between two limits for x, even very close. This is consistent with a level two 
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conception of continuity, visualizing a perceptually continuous function being drawn 
between two limits. It is consistent with Cauchy’s idea of a variable quantity moving 
along the curve. Hence it relates to the continuity of (a part of) the curve as a variable 
point moves along it, rather than as a pointwise definition of continuity found in 
modern analysis. 
The possible meanings of the definitions of continuity and limit become clearer 
when we consider the examples that Cauchy gives in Cours D’Analyse (figure 4). 
In this figure, the functions in the first list are said to be continuous ‘in the 
neighbourhood of a finite value (attributed to) x’ where that finite value lies between 
the ‘limites’ –∞ and +∞. A modern mathematician may translate this as saying ‘for 
all finite x’. However, Cauchy sees these points varying between the ‘limites’, in a 
manner which is quite natural when those limits involve potentially infinite quantities 
either horizontally or vertically at either end. 
The function 
 
a / x  is continuous between two separate ‘limites’, one between –∞ 
and 0, the other between 0 and ∞. 
 
Figure 4: Continuous functions 
Returning now to the limit of 
 
sin(1/ x)  as x tends to zero considered earlier in figure 
2, we find a much more interesting phenomenon. Once again the function is defined 
and continuous in a neighbourhood of each finite value of x to the left and to the right 
of the origin. Following the example of 
 
a / x , we can again see the function is 
continuous in two parts, ‘1st between the limits 
 
x = −∞  and 
 
x = 0 ’ and ‘2nd between 
the limits 
 
x = 0  and 
 
x = ∞’. The limit 
 
x = −∞  may be adjoined to the left portion of 
the graph and 
 
y = ∞  to the right, consistent both with the Euclidean notion of a point 
being an endpoint of a (curved) line and also the French terminology of ‘limite’ as 
the endpoint of an interval. 
This follows the same pattern as before, adjoining a single extra point at the end of 
a line. However, near the origin, a different phenomenon occurs. (Figure 5.) 
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Figure 5: The graph of sin(1/x) 
If we restrict ourselves either to moving in from the left or from the right, drawing 
the curve with a physical pencil, our strokes move closer and closer to the vertical 
interval on the y-axis from –1 to +1 and we end up running our practical pencil up 
and down closer and closer to the y-axis which acts as a barrier, as a limit to our 
progress. 
Figure 6 show the curve being drawn from the right as x moves down to zero. It 
will eventually end up moving up and down perceptually between –1 and 1 on the y-
axis, even though, theoretically it is close to it rather than being on top of it. At 
Donald’s level two of perceptual continuity, we sense the hand moving up and down, 
covering the y-axis within the thickness of the pencil on the interval from –1 to +1. 
 
Figure 6: A smooth pencil drawing moving from the right to the left 
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The picture becomes more interesting when we follow Cauchy’s idea of a focusing 
on a sequence a1, a2, a3, … , an, … where the x-values tend to zero. Figure 7a, shows 
the first twenty terms when the nth term is calculated for x = 1/n. The terms 
successively move right to left along the curve. Figure 7b, shows the terms from 
n = 100 to 1000. The finite width of the dots marking the points give an infinite 
number of points (apparently) on the vertical axis from –1 to +1. 
  
Figure 7a: an (n = 1 to 20) Figure 7b: an (n = 100 to 1,000) 
We now see the limiting values, in a sense which is compatible with Cauchy’s idea 
that the limit of sin(1/x) as x tends to 0 is, in Cauchy’s own words: 
une infinité de valeurs comprises entre les limites –1 et +1. 
4.6 Cauchy’s development of meaning 1821–1853 
In his Cours D’Analyse, Cauchy identifies quantities as (signed) lengths. An 
‘infiniment petit’ is not a fixed length, it is a variable quantity where a succession of 
values becomes arbitrarily small. It occurs in expressions such as  which 
represents a succession of values as α becomes small. 
However, he uses the term ‘infiniment petit’ as a noun and computes with it as a 
variable quantity that ‘becomes’ small. In this way it takes on a cognitive existence of 
its own. He later uses infinitesimals not only in computing limits, derivatives and 
integrals, but as explicit entities in their own right. For instance, in 1827, he uses 
quantities involving infinitesimals as the limits (endpoints) of integrals in more 
complicated expressions such as 
 
f (x + α)
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where α, ε, δ are infinitesimals and ε is an infinitesimal of the second order compared 
to δ (for instance 
 
ε = δ 2), (Cauchy 1827, p. 188). He also uses these highly complex 
expressions in his development of a formula for a unit-impulse, infinitely tall, 
infinitely narrow delta function defined in terms of infinitesimals. In this way, he 
invented the Dirac delta function in infinitesimal terms a century before Dirac. (See 
Laugwitz, 1989, p. 230.) 
In 1853, he responded to criticisms of his theorem, which states that ‘the limit 
 
s(x) 
of a convergent sequence of continuous functions 
 
sn(x)  is continuous’, and is now 
seen to contradict ideas relating to Fourier series. Cauchy is fully aware that the 
convergence condition fails for the Fourier series 
  
1
sin( )
n
n
k
kx
s x
k=
=∑  
if the hypothesis of convergence is interpreted to apply only at ordinary (real) points.  
Cauchy responds by reasserting his original definitions of continuity and 
convergence, calculating the error term 
 
s(x) − s
n
(x)  for the variable quantity 
 
x = 1/ n, 
and concluding that the convergence hypothesis is not satisfied. What Cauchy is 
pointing out is that, if the hypothesis of convergence is interpreted as applying at 
additional values (in particular, infinitesimal ones generated by ), then the 
sum theorem remains valid (Cauchy, 1853, p. 33). See (Bråting, 2007) for details. 
This fine distinction has led to enormous controversy as later authors attempt to 
interpret Cauchy’s ideas through a conflation of his original worded definition and 
subsequent set-theoretic definitions of pointwise and uniform convergence. In a 
similar vein, Núñez et al. (1999) bring together the names of Cauchy and Weierstrass 
to speak of the ‘Cauchy-Weierstrass definition of continuity’. J. Gray (2008, p. 62) 
lists continuity among concepts Cauchy allegedly defined using ‘limiting arguments’, 
but as we discussed in Section 9, ‘limits’ appear in Cauchy's definition only in the 
sense of endpoints of an interval, rather than ‘limits’ as in variables tending to a 
quantity.  Not to be outdone, Kline (1980, p. 273) claims that "Cauchy's work not 
only banished [infinitesimals] but disposed of any need for them." Hawking (2007, p. 
639) does reproduce Cauchy's infinitesimal definition, yet on the same page claims 
that Cauchy "was particularly concerned to banish infinitesimals," apparently 
unaware of a comical non-sequitur he committed. 
Borovik & Katz (2012) argue that the term ‘Cauchy-Weierstrass definition of 
continuity’ is inappropriate, because Cauchy’s definition is based on infinitesimals 
rather than on Weierstrassian epsilon-delta methods. They note that Cauchy’s notion 
of limit was kinetic rather than epsilontic (see also Sinaceur 1973), and that his work 
 
x = 1/ n
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on the orders of growth of infinitesimals inspired later theories of infinitesimals by 
Paul du Bois-Reymond, as noted also by Borel (1902, p. 35–36). 
Extending Bråting’s analysis of Cauchy’s infinitesimals, Katz & Katz (2011) argue 
that the traditional approach to Cauchy following Boyer and Grabiner contains an 
internal contradiction: on the one hand, Cauchy’s infinitesimal definition is 
interpreted as applying only at standard real values of the input; yet the condition of 
Cauchy’s sum theorem of 1853 is routinely interpreted as a condition of uniform 
convergence, which is only possible if one allows variable (in particular, 
infinitesimal) values of the input  (such as ). 
Katz & Katz (2012) argue that post-Weistrassian infinitesimal-free readings of 
Cauchy focus on those aspects that fit the modern use of epsilon arguments without 
fully taking into account his use of infinitesimals.  Błaszczyk et al. (2013) re-examine 
Grabiner’s claim that Cauchy’s proof of the intermediate value theorem contains 
germs of the epsilon-delta method and offer an alternative view that Cauchy’s proof 
fits squarely within his infinitesimal approach. 
He is using the same modus operandi from his earlier years, computing functions 
whose inputs are variable quantities, in this case the ‘infiniment petit’ variable 
 
(1/ n)  
which is specified as a sequence of ordinary numbers with limit zero. 
He does not see the number line as the aggregate of real numbers as in the modern 
set-theoretic viewpoint. Rather, he sees a line with points on it. He imagines 
quantities on this line where a quantity may be a fixed constant, or it may vary as in 
the sequence (1, ½, …, 1/n, …) whose value is computed at each fixed number in the 
sequence to give a new sequence (
 
f (x +1), 
 
f (x + 12 ), … 
 
f (x + 1n) , …) of numbers 
which he sees once more as a variable quantity. 
Cauchy’s work can be seen more equitably as a natural development of the 
evolution of mathematical ideas in a Lakatosian sense (Koetsier, 2010). Cauchy 
makes sense of infinitesimals in a concrete fashion in terms of sequences of signed 
numbers that tend to zero.  He then deals with increasingly sophisticated situations in 
which his infinitesimals as processes of becoming small are mentally compressed 
into infinitesimals as manipulable concepts. 
It should not be assumed that the evolution of mathematical ideas always produces 
‘better’ results or that our current views are final and will not continue to evolve. For 
instance, our current set-theoretic ideas of functions and relations lose some subtleties 
that exist in Cauchy’s version of calculus. In particular, the pragmatic decision to 
make functions single-valued loses the dynamic idea of two variables ‘co-varying’ 
which is part of the current development of educational views of the calculus. If we 
consider, for example, the inverse function of 
 
sin x , we are now forced to artificially 
choose a part of the domain, for instance selecting 
 
sin−1(x) to lie between 
 
−pi / 2 and 
 
pi / 2 . But Cauchy imagined a multi-valued function 
 
arcsin((x)) and, if we were to 
choose any one of these values and denote it by y where 
 
y = sin x  and allow it to vary 
on the graph of 
 
sin x , then Cauchy’s notion of continuity would allow this particular 
 
x = 1/ n
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value of y to co-vary with x as x moves over an artificially selected endpoint such as 
 
x = pi / 2. 
More serious difficulties arise with relations such as 
 
x2 + y2 = k , which is a circle 
and y is no longer considered to be a function of x. Yet, if one traces a finger round 
such a circle, the values of x and y co-vary in the sense of Cauchy. This arises quite 
naturally in physical situations such as the motion of a weight hanging on a string 
from a fixed point and moving in a horizontal circle where the Cartesian coordinates 
of its position in a horizontal plane co-vary. The modern single-valued notion of 
function has many advantages but it does not fit all possible cases, particularly in 
naturally occurring ‘continuous’ change as modelled in applied mathematics. The 
ideas of Cauchy continue to have merit, even if we insist on new set-theoretic 
definitions of functions and continuous change in mathematical analysis. 
5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL PROOF 
The shift to the formal world of Hilbertian set theory involves a fundamental change 
of meaning in which the concepts are not naturally occurring phenomena that ‘have’ 
properties, as in Euclidean geometry or in arithmetic and its generalization in algebra. 
In today’s formal presentation they are set-theoretic concepts given as a list of 
axioms and what matters are the consequences of the properties specified explicitly 
by the axioms and any additional definitions within the axiomatic system. 
An axiomatically defined structure may apply in many quite different situations. 
Often, as in the case of the axiomatic definition of a group there are many different 
examples of groups that can be partitioned into collections that are isomorphic to 
each other. In the case of a ‘complete ordered field’ there is, up to isomorphism, only 
one example: the real numbers, which may be embodied as a complete number line 
or expressed symbolically as infinite decimals with appropriate properties. 
As Cantor extended numbers both in terms of the complete ordered field of real 
numbers and his theory of infinite cardinals, he believed that he had not only given a 
logical foundation to real analysis, he had simultaneously eliminated infinitesimals, 
declaring them to be the cholera bacillus of mathematics (in a letter of 12 December 
1893, quoted in Meschkowski 1965, p. 505). Successive generations of pure 
mathematicians have followed his lead and accepted epsilon-delta analysis as the 
proper formal approach. 
But the evolution of mathematical ideas moves on. The formalism of Hilbert does 
not grant the right to Cantor or anyone else to deny the existence of infinitesimals on 
logical grounds.  
Cantor’s rejection of infinitesimals on the real number line relates to his perception 
of real numbers, which form a complete ordered field and therefore, rightly, cannot 
include infinitesimals. However, this does not mean that there cannot be ordered 
fields K that extend  ℝ  that contain not only real numbers, but also positive elements 
x that satisfy 0 < x < r for all positive
 
r∈ℝ . Such an element is a positive 
infinitesimal in the larger ordered field K. There are many examples of such fields, 
including not only the hyperreal numbers in non-standard analysis, but also simpler 
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fields such as the field of rational functions in an element x where we define 0 < x < r 
for any positive real number r, or the field of quotients of power series in x, which 
Tall (1979) showed was sufficient to deal with the calculus of all analytic functions 
that occur in regular calculus courses, including the calculus of Leibniz, without the 
need for the sophisticated  logic of non-standard analysis. 
If K is any ordered field that contains the real numbers as a proper subfield, then a 
simple structure theorem using the completeness of  proves formally that every 
finite element of K (lying between two real numbers) is either a real number or a 
unique real number plus an infinitesimal (Tall, 1982b, 2001). Although a real number 
c cannot be distinguished by the naked eye from a nearby element 
 
c + ε , when is 
an infinitesimal, a linear map of the form
 
f (x) = mx + b  can be used to magnify 
infinitesimal detail. For instance, the map 
 
µ : K → K  given by 
 
µ(x) = (x − c) / ε  
maps c to 0 and 
 
c + ε  to 1, with any other nearby point 
 
c + kε  mapped on to k 
(Stroyan, 1972; Tall, 1980). In particular, for any real number k, this allows 
infinitesimal detail 
 
c + kε  to be mapped on to the whole real number line. Of course, 
this map will transform the point 
 
c + ε 2  onto 
 
µ(c + ε 2 ) = ε  and the difference 
between the images is again too small to see with the perceptual eye, because higher 
order differences remain infinitesimal after the act of magnification (see Tall (2001, 
2013).  
This simple theorem has a remarkable interpretation. If we call the elements of K 
‘quantities’ and the elements of  ℝ  ‘constants’, then the ordered field K contains 
infinite quantities, whose inverses are infinitesimal quantities, and the finite elements 
in K are either constants or a constant plus an infinitesimal. In this way any ordered 
extension of the real numbers defined formally can be verbalised in the language of 
Cauchy! While this may not in any way ‘explain’ Cauchy’s thinking, it shows that his 
infinitesimal ideas can evolve to take their rightful place in today’s axiomatic formal 
approach. 
Thus infinitesimals, so strongly denied by Cantor, are a natural consequence of 
Hilbertian formalism. While we should still honour Cantor for putting mathematical 
analysis on a rigorous basis by defining the real numbers as a complete ordered field, 
we now realise that he did not eliminate infinitesimals at all. They simply lie in a 
larger mathematical structure that can be defined formally, manipulated symbolically, 
and visualised perceptually. 
It therefore does no service to argue whether Cauchy was a proto-Weierstrass 
foreseeing the development of epsilon-delta analysis or a proto-Robinson foreseeing 
the advent of non-standard analysis. He was neither. He was an intellectual 
practitioner who lived in an era building on Greek ideas of geometry extended 
through Descartes’ links between geometry and algebra to operationalize the notion 
of continuity, with a cultural vision of ‘limites’ and infinitesimals that were generated 
by ordinary sequences of numbers with limit zero. 
Rather than analysing his techniques from a modern viewpoint, it would be more 
appropriate to seek to understand Cauchy’s ideas as part of the evolution of 
 ℝ
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mathematical ideas in the style of Lakatos (1976). We will then recognize his unique 
contribution to mathematics based on a combination of human perception, 
operational symbolism and intellectual reason using ways of thinking that are 
appropriate to his own era. 
5.1 The evolution of theoretical frameworks 
Since Cauchy’s time, new ways of thinking have emerged that subtly modify the 
ways in which we think about mathematics. Cantor’s view of the number line 
emerged at a time when axiomatic definitions and formal proof were evolving, yet 
still implicitly attached to human perception of the number line and the arithmetic of 
numbers. The full implications of Hilbert’s vision of formal axiomatics had yet to be 
fully grasped. 
Hilbert’s views were to flower into the set-theoretic formulation of definitions and 
proof found in modern mathematical analysis. Yet is was not long in development 
before Gödel’s theorem showed that formal systems that included the integers would 
have too many theorems to be able to prove each of them in only a finite number of 
steps. Then came the logical ideas of Robinson that placed the real number system 
within a larger hyperreal number system with infinitesimals that again led to vigorous 
controversy between different communities of practice. 
As we consider these ongoing disputes, we recall the scheme of Perry (1970), who 
described the development of college students setting out with a belief that truth 
exists in absolute terms of right and wrong, so that some authorities are correct and 
others are not, passing through a stage that realized there may be alternative answers 
where some are better than others, and moving to the recognition that there are 
different, legitimate alternatives. 
As we review the varying opinions of Cauchy’s ideas it becomes evident to us that 
it is naïve to see differing viewpoints simply as right or wrong in absolute terms and 
to acknowledge that various principles may operate more successfully in one context 
as compared with another. In particular, in attempting to make sense of the 
intellectual developments of students, we would be wise to acknowledge explicitly 
the evolving nature of our own theoretical frameworks, in particular, the shift from 
natural thinking about quantities that we imagine as being ‘arbitrarily small’ and the 
formal epsilon-delta definitions of mathematical analysis. This would enable us to 
have a broader view of the conceptions of others that may make complete sense in 
one community of practice yet be less appropriate in another. It continues to 
encourage pure mathematicians to pursue the rigour of formal epsilon delta analysis 
while allowing applied mathematicians to utilise the powerful blend of dynamic 
human perceptions and the symbolic use of operational symbolism to formulate and 
predict solutions of problems in applications. 
It may even allow us to move to the final level of Perry’s scheme where we allow 
the possibility of different, equally legitimate alternatives, where each applies 
appropriately in a particular theoretical or practical situation. 
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6. STUDENT CONCEPTIONS 
Cauchy’s great insights into the nature of continuity, limits and infinitesimals reveal a 
refined human mind seeking to make sense of ideas of variability in operational terms 
that sought to make sense of the potentially infinite process of ‘getting close’ to a 
‘limiting value’. Our students today may not have Cauchy’s exceptional skills, but 
they do share with him a human brain that perceives fundamental concepts of 
variation and continuity in the same biological manner. 
Roh (2008) introduced an innovative approach to the formal definition of limit of a 
sequence 
 
a1 , 
 
a2 , … using human perception by placing a transparent strip with 
parallel lines distance ±ε  apart over a picture of a sequence of points plotted as a 
graph to see if the sequence lay between the lines for all but a finite number of 
values. By imagining this activity for smaller values of ε, the students were 
encouraged to suggest their own definition of convergence. The research revealed 
three distinct conceptions of a limit: 
(i) an asymptotic view in which the sequence approaches but does not reach 
the limit, such as (1/n) ‘approaching’ zero, but excluding a constant 
sequence which do not approach the limit because it is already there; 
(ii) a cluster point view in which the sequence may cluster round several 
values, as happens with 
 
(−1)n(1+1/ n)); 
(iii) the modern limit concept with a unique limit. 
Remarkably, all these three conceptions arose in history. The first—which often 
occurs in our students—is found in the original conception of Leibniz and also in 
Newton’s notion of prime and ultimate ratios in which the prime ratio of 
 
(x + o)n − xn  
to o for a non-zero value o tends to the ratio 
 
nx
n−1
 to 1, but is never equal to it 
(Newton, 1704). The second relates to the notion of limit expressed by Cauchy in the 
Cours D’Analyse, where sequences cluster around one or more points that may be 
infinite in size or infinite in number. The third is the modern definition that replaces a 
sense of dynamic change by a logical challenge. 
This analysis shows clearly that what are often described in the research literature 
as student ‘misconceptions’ are more appropriately described as ‘pre-conceptions’ 
that occur at early stages of development and may or may not blossom into a more 
widely accepted formal concepts. 
Like Cauchy, our modern students have experiences with drawing graphs and 
manipulating symbols but are unlikely to have encountered the formal set-theoretic 
epsilon-delta approach. We are confronted with the serious question: why, if the 
notion of dynamic change worked for a mathematician as good as Cauchy and 
continue to work in applications today, do we introduce all our students in their early 
experiences in the calculus with a definitional version of limit that is so different 
from their current experience? 
The mathematical community shares a common expertise acknowledged by 
mathematics educators in which the limit concept has allowed them to produce far 
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more powerful methods of definition and proof and it is natural for them as experts to 
wish to introduce their novice students to this more powerful mode of operation. 
Some students do indeed benefit by a ‘formal’ approach based on ‘extracting 
meaning’ from definitions and deductions rather than a more ‘natural’ approach, 
‘giving meaning’ to definitions based on their previous experience of embodiment 
and symbolism. Pinto & Tall (1999, 2001) used such a framework to analyse the 
progress of students learning mathematical analysis in a standard university course 
and found that students could be successful both with either a ‘natural’ or ‘formal’ 
approach, but that many found conflict between the new ideas and their previous 
experience that often led them into difficulties. Weber (2004) expanded this 
observation by noting that many students followed ‘natural’ or ‘formal’ routes but 
many more solved their difficulties by a ‘procedural’ route in which they side-tracked 
their problems by learning proofs by rote to reproduce in examinations. 
Alcock and Simpson (2005) reported the successful learning of students in an 
analysis course who operate ‘almost exclusively by means of verbal and algebraic 
reasoning, and tend not to incorporate visual images into their work’. This is 
consonant with acknowledging a spectrum of approaches using natural and formal 
ideas. Indeed, it is an advantage in mathematical research for individuals to have 
different ways of thinking about problems to share different aspects of the creation of 
new theoretical developments. 
Mejia-Ramos and Tall (2004) put forward the thesis that calculus naturally belongs 
to the worlds of embodiment to conceptualise problem situations and symbolism to 
formulate mathematical models using the operations of calculus to solve problems. 
This is the foundation that is required in real world problem-solving in applications. 
According to this view, the calculus belongs to the natural world of human perception 
and operation, using familiar pictures and symbolic calculation and manipulation, 
while analysis belongs to the formal world of definition and proof. It is natural to 
encourage those who use the calculus in applications to be aware of its natural 
strengths and possible weaknesses. Meanwhile, a formal approach can involve 
standard analysis with the Weierstrassian definitions, or non-standard analysis using 
the logical notions of infinitesimals, both of which may be seen to evolve through 
succeeding generations using a subtler formal interpretation of the conceptions of 
limit and infinitesimals envisaged by Cauchy. 
These observations relating to student development are consonant with the 
historical evidence of conceptual changes that occurred over the years, from the 
separation between the platonic geometry of the Greeks and the arithmetic of 
number, through the evolution of operational symbolism of various kinds of number, 
from magnitudes without sign, to signed numbers, rational and irrational numbers, 
variable quantities that may become large or small, and other developments in 
complex numbers and beyond. There is also the fundamental schism between 
mathematics that we sense in the external world and imagine as perfect platonic ideas 
and the subtle shift to axiomatic formal mathematics based on set-theoretic 
definitions. 
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These are reflected in the theoretical framework built from the cognitive 
psychology of human perception and dynamic action in Donald’s level 1 and 2, 
moving on to level 3 extended awareness as mathematics develops through 
increasingly sophisticated conceptual embodiment and operational symbolism and 
later makes the significant transition into axiomatic formalism. 
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL THEORISTS AND 
MATHEMATICS EDUCATORS 
This analysis of the mathematics of Cauchy seen through the ideas of those who have 
the benefit of the later evolution of ideas has aspects in common with the analyses of 
student thinking by experts in mathematics and mathematics education who have 
more sophisticated views that they wish to convey to students in the calculus and 
later in mathematical analysis. 
There are many possible approaches including the standard ‘intuitive limit’ 
approach in modern College Calculus texts such as Stewart (2011), Larson & 
Edwards (2009), a multi-representational approached based on numeric, symbolic 
and graphic representations (Hughes-Hallett et al., 2009), the cooperative learning 
approach to quantified definitions in Dubinsky’s APOS theory (Cottrill et al. 1996), 
or an infinitesimal approach based on non-standard analysis by Keisler (1976). 
Computer technology introduces completely new possibilities, building on human 
perception and action, passing much of the technical operation to software such as 
Mathematica, Maple, Cabri Géomètre, SketchPad, Geogebra, on computers, graphic 
calculators, and the enactive interface of iPads, interacting with the internet and 
learning cooperatively in classrooms, using wireless technologies and other modes of 
representation and communication. 
Faced with such a plethora of possibilities, how does one cut through the morass of 
detail and seek the fundamental ideas in the calculus that both make sense to students 
and also provide them with the computational power required in today’s modern 
technological world? The analysis of both historical and cognitive evolution of 
mathematical concepts given here suggests the need to reflect on the manner in which 
human thinking grows from perception and action into imaginative thought 
experiments and operational symbolism, developing increasingly sophisticated forms 
of human reason. 
This confirms the clear schism between the dynamic calculus of Cauchy and the 
set-theoretic formal approach of modern analysis as revealed by the thorny path of 
the evolution of mathematical concepts in history and the difficulties encountered by 
students today. 
On the one hand the approach of Dubinsky and his colleagues (Asiala et al., 1996) 
sought to encourage students to make sense of quantified statements through 
cooperative programming. However, even though many students were able to 
conceptualise functions as processes, only a few understood the formal definition of 
limit, and not one student in a study by Cottrill et al. (1996) constructed the formal 
definition spontaneously. 
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On the other hand, Núñez et al. (1999) saw ‘formal epsilon-delta continuity’ as 
being very different from ‘natural continuity’ based on human embodiment and 
perception. Lakoff & Núñez (2002) took the argument further, rejecting the views of 
mathematicians that ‘mathematics is universal, absolute and certain’ and contrasted 
the ‘beautiful story of mathematics’ presented by mathematicians with ‘the sad 
consequences’ that the formal approach ‘intimidates people’ and ‘makes mathematics 
beyond the reach of even intelligent students with other primary interests and skills,’ 
(pp. 339–341). 
Yet some students, perhaps only a few, espouse a formal approach (Alcock & 
Simpson, 2005) while many others find the transition from natural experiences of 
visual and symbolic school mathematics to the formal limit to be problematic.  
Instead of seeing one approach to be ‘good’ and the other ‘bad’, depending on 
one’s point of view, it is more appropriate to construct a mature understanding that 
acknowledges there are alternative approaches that are valid in their appropriate 
contexts and that some approaches may be more appropriate than others in a given 
context. 
With the premise that our conceptions depend on our experience, it may help to 
reflect on the idea that what is ‘natural’ may depend on how each of us develops over 
time. The calculus of Cauchy imagines natural variation of quantities that have arisen 
through two millennia of observing straight lines and smooth curves in Greek 
geometry and the development of calculus where a smooth curve is a mental 
extrapolation of the movement of a finger drawing a curve using a pencil on paper or 
a stick drawing a line in the sand. Initially, when these experiences were symbolised, 
it was always in terms of regular functions given by algebraic and trigonometric 
expression. Now we have a broader concept of functions which may be both 
continuous yet so irregular that they are nowhere differentiable. 
To take account of the human origins of mathematical thinking, Tall (2012) 
proposed an approach based on perceptual change that sees continuity in terms of the 
dynamic continuous movement of a point (at Donald’s level 2) and differentiability in 
terms of ‘local straightness’ in which a curve, when highly magnified, looks 
increasingly like a straight line. This takes us back to the world of Leibniz who 
imagined his curves as polygons with an infinite number of infinitesimal straight 
sides. 
A ‘locally straight’ view provides an aesthetic extension to Leibniz’s vision, in that 
his infinitesimally sided polygons have corners. These may only involve an 
infinitesimal change in direction, yet they are corners all the same. The ‘locally 
straight’ approach looks closely at a smooth graph and sees it looking locally like a 
straight line everywhere. This links to Cauchy’s vision of a graph as a curved line on 
which a variable point may vary in a dynamically continuous fashion; local 
straightness also reflects the ‘natural’ idea of continuity conceived by Lakoff and 
Núñez in which the graph has a tangent at every point. 
A locally straight approach also allows the individual to imagine the difference 
between a function simply being continuous and one that is suitably smooth for the 
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purposes of calculus. A non-differentiable function no longer magnifies to look 
straight everywhere. It may have a corner at a single point, or it may be so wrinkled 
that it nowhere magnifies to look straight (Tall, 1982a). 
This radically challenges the view of what is ‘natural’ according to Lakoff and his 
colleagues. If one can imagine a function that is very wrinkled, then being non-
differentiable becomes a ‘natural’ concept. It is all a matter of building on appropriate 
experience. 
The denigration of formal approaches of mathematicians and its ‘sad 
consequences’ described by Lakoff and Núñez remains true if one only considers 
traditional approaches to learning mathematics, but it should now be considered in a 
broader light. Even though many students find difficulty with the formalities, those 
who learn to work with formalism are also human beings using human brains. Formal 
mathematics develops a network of formal theorems, some of which prove to be 
structure theorems that reveal formal structures possessing embodied and symbolic 
meanings. (Tall, 2001, 2013). Typical examples are: 
A finite group specified formally by axioms is isomorphic to a group of transformations 
that has an embodied representation as the symmetries of a figure and a symbolic 
representation as a subgroup of the permutation group  Sn; 
a finite n-dimensional vector space over a field K is isomorphic to 
 
K n , which provides a 
symbolic interpretation using matrices and, in the case where  K = ℝ  and n = 2 or 3, it 
also provides an embodiment in two or three dimensional space; 
a formal complete ordered field has a unique embodiment as a geometric number line 
with points representing rationals and irrationals that may also be represented 
symbolically as the arithmetic of decimal numbers. 
With the possibility that formal axiomatic systems lead back to embodied and 
symbolic representations now enhanced by formal proof, we see that ‘the beautiful 
story of mathematics’ is indeed an aesthetic human creation in which formal ideas 
may also be imagined and manipulated by combining human perception, operational 
symbolism and axiomatic formal proof. What happens in practice is that 
mathematicians develop personal preferences for one or more of these aspects. 
The moral of this story is that our cultural views of mathematics, even if they are 
widely shared, such as the principle of building the calculus on an ‘intuitive’ version 
of the limit concept, are fundamentally dependent on our shared history of personal 
experiences. While we persist in teaching our students ideas about limits that are 
implicitly founded on an axiomatic formal approach to mathematics, we produce a 
succession of generations that pass on ideas that may appeal to a few but are 
confusing for many. This is often the case in the teaching of college calculus where 
students are required to work through compendious volumes that cover every 
possible topic. 
There is a need to cater for a wider spectrum of students who furnish a broader 
range of participation in our complex society. We certainly require mathematicians 
who can think formally and evolve new theories of mathematics who benefit from a 
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formal approach. We also require pragmatic mathematicians who apply mathematical 
ideas to solve real world problems. And we need to provide courses in the calculus 
that make genuine sense of ideas of the dynamic rates of change and growth of 
variable quantities for a much broader population of students. 
In the quest to provide approaches to the calculus appropriate for different kinds of 
student, we should be mindful of the insights of Cauchy. His combination of 
Euclidean geometry and dynamic movement links naturally to the perceptual idea of 
dynamic continuity that can now be represented using interactive computer graphics. 
His ideas of infinitesimal quantities, generated by computable sequences of numbers 
that become small, uses the same natural mechanism in which such a process is 
named and then imagined as an arbitrarily small quantity. 
Cauchy’s ideas of function, continuity, limit and infinitesimal play a significant 
role in the evolution of modern ideas of the calculus prior to the introduction of the 
formal limit in mathematical analysis. Using the perceptual idea of local straightness, 
dynamic variation can be programmed interactively to enable the learner to explore 
the changing slope of standard functions to predict the formulae for their derivatives 
in a meaningful human way. Having experienced the derivatives of standard 
functions perceptually, it becomes more natural to formulate the modern limit 
concept as a technique to compute the precise symbolic formulae for the derivatives 
of combinations of such functions. 
The ideas of Cauchy are not only appropriate for his own era, they provide a basis 
for the evolution of all modern approaches to the calculus, be it through the 
pragmatic use of the Leibniz notation in applications, the use of interactive dynamic 
computer graphics to visualise ideas and software programs that manipulate 
symbolism, or the more rigorous developments in standard or non-standard analysis. 
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